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Abstract This paper contains a detailed account of the notion of admissibility in
the setting of consequence relations. It is proved that the two notions of admissibil-
ity used in the literature coincide, and it provides an extension to multi–conclusion
consequence relations that is more general than the one usually encountered in the
literature on admissibility. The notion of a rule scheme is introduced to capture
rules with side conditions, and it is shown that what is generally understood under
the extension of a consequence relation by a rule can be extended naturally to rule
schemes, and that such extensions capture the intuitive idea of extending a logic by a
rule.
Keywords Consequence relations · Admissible rules · Multi–conclusion logic ·
Rule schemes
1 Introduction
In this paper our aim is to provide a framework in which to reason about the admissi-
bility of rules of inference. In most papers on admissibility consequence relations are
taken as the fundamental notion via which to represent logics or theories, and in this
paper we provide arguments that support this choice. None of these arguments are
very deep or completely new, but we feel it is worthwhile to present them in detail
because in the literature they remain mostly implicit.
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One of the incentives to spell out the details of what in most papers is discussed
only briefly (and for good reasons) is the phenomenon, as pointed out in [9], that
admissibility is defined in two ways in the literature, in what we will call the full and
the strict way. Given a theory or logic L and a rule R:
(full) R is admissible in L if L extended by R has the same theorems as L.
(strict) R is admissible in L if under all substitutions, whenever all premisses of R
become theorems of L, then so does the conclusion.
In talks and informal expositions on admissibility the first definition is often used,
while the second one seems to be preferred in formal settings. Informally, it is quite
easy to argue that the two definitions are equivalent, but if one wishes to make this
precise, several issues appear that need to be addressed. For example, in the full
definition of admissibility one has to describe what it means to extend a theory or
logic by a rule. If the theory is given to us via a proof system, this might be quite
straightforward, but if the theory is characterized in another way, say via a set of
models or algebras, it is less clear what is meant. In this paper we describe what this
means in detail, in a way that is applicable in many settings.
As is common in the literature on admissible rules, we choose consequence rela-
tions as our general framework. Since Tarski, consequence relations are traditionally
used in the literature to capture the notion of consequence in a very general way,
abstracting away from particular theories and particular syntax [15, 17]. We describe
the notion of a rule scheme (a rule with a set of substitutions) that captures, we
think, what is generally meant by a rule of inference in a mathematical or logical
context. Then we define what it means to extend a consequence relation by a set of
rule schemes, which is a slight generalization of a similar notion that occurs at many
places in the literature. And we show in Proposition 3 (a reformulation of a theorem in
[14]) that in this way, derivations in the extension indeed are derivations that consist
of inferences that either belong to the original consequence relation or are instances
of the rules added in the extension. Thus supporting the claim that this is the correct
way to define what it means to extend a consequence relation by a rule (scheme).
Substitutions, as required for the strict definition of admissibility, are described in
Section 2.3.
Finally, we address another issue in this paper, namely the analogue of the above
definitions for multi–conclusion consequence relations. Such relations are useful in
the setting of admissibility because they allow one to express the disjunction property,
which is the property that if A ∨ B is a theorem, then so is one of the disjuncts. This
property, satisfied by many constructive theories including intuitionistic logic, can be
expressed via admissibility, provided admissibility is defined in one of the following
two ways.
(dp-full) R is admissible in L if L extended by R has the same theorems as L.
(dp-strict) R is admissible in L if under all substitutions, whenever all premisses
of R become theorems of L, then so does at least one formula in the
conclusion.
Because in this way, {A ∨ B}/{A,B} is admissible in a logic if and only if the logic
has the disjunction property.
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In this paper we consider the following generalizations of the above notions that,
we think, are the genuine analogues, in a multi–conclusion setting, of the single–
conclusion notions.
(full) R is admissible in L if L extended by R has the same multi–conclusion
theorems as L.
(strict) R = Γ/Δ is admissible in L if under all substitutions Σ and for all finite
sets Σ , whenever σA,Σ is a multi–conclusion theorem of L for all A ∈ Γ ,
then so is σΔ,Σ .
At first sight, one might guess that the strict view would be
R is admissible in L if under all substitutions, whenever all expressions in the pre-
miss of R become theorems of L, then the conclusion becomes a multi–conclusion
theorem of L.
But in Proposition 6 it is shown that the full and strict definition above are equivalent,
and Remark 1 explains why the alternative is not. Thus explaining our choice of the
strict view.
In many papers on admissibility, the dp-full or dp-strict view is taken as the defi-
nition of admissibility. In Section 5 we explain how this choice naturally fits into our
framework. Whether there are other reasonable strict definitions of admissibility in
a multi–conclusion setting is an issue that we leave open for speculation and further
research.
Several observations in Section 3 also occur in one way or another in the book on
multiple–conclusion logic by Shoesmith and Smiley [14]. But as our approach differs
in some respects from the one in that book, we have included proofs also of the the-
orems covered there. Metcalfe in [9] studies similar problems as the ones addressed
in this paper, but then in an algebraic context. He also distinguishes the strict and
full view, though using different terminology, and proves that in an algebraic setting
these notions do not always coincide for multi–conclusion rules.
2 Consequence Relations
When Tarski spoke in Paris at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy
in 1935 on logical consequence [15], he tried to characterize in all generality what
it means for a sentence A to logically follow from a set of sentences Γ . He arrived
at the definition that this is so if and only if every model of the sentences in Γ is a
model of A. This led to the introduction and study of consequence relations, which
are relations between sets of expressions and expressions, that satisfy reflexivity,
transitivity and weakening. The Polish School has been particularly active in the area
of consequence relations, which is no coincidence given Tarski’s Polish background.
See [17] for an overview of its results.
Consequence relations play a central role in this paper, as we assume all the the-
ories or logics that we consider to be given by a consequence relation. This is no
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great restriction as they cover almost all reasonable theories. As said in the introduc-
tion, in this paper we want to define in detail what it means that a rule of inference is
admissible in a certain theory. As this has more to do with consequence relations in
general and the way in which they can be extended by rules, results about particular
logics will be only discussed as illustration of the general theory. For an overview
of the area of admissible rules, the reader is referred to the literature, in particular to
Rybakov’s monograph [12]. For a brief overview of the main results in this area on
intermediate and modal logics, see [6].
We start by defining what a consequence relation is. To maintain a certain level
of generality we assume that there is a language L, which is a set of symbols, and
that there is a set of expressions FL in this language. In this way consequence rela-
tions can be about regular formulas as well as other expressions, such as sequents or
clauses. In a setting where expressions are usually called formulas, we will do so too.
In the case of propositional logic, the language, Lp, consists of infinitely many
propositional variables p, q, r, . . . , parentheses ( and ), the connectives ¬,→,∧,∨
and the constants  and ⊥. The set of expressions FLp is the set of propositional
formulas in language Lp, defined as usual. The language, Ls , for sequents in propo-
sitional logic consists of Lp extended with ⇒, the braces { and } and the comma.
FLs consists of the sequents in Lp, that is, of all expressions Γ ⇒ Δ, where Γ
and Δ are finite sets of formulas in Lp. The language, Lf , of predicate or first-order
logic consists of predicates and functions, for every arity infinitely many, infinitely
many variables, parentheses ( and ), the connectives ¬,→,∧,∨, constants  and ⊥
and quantifiers ∃, ∀. The set of expressions FLf is the set of first-order formulas in
language Lf , defined as usual.
2.1 Multi–conclusion Consequence Relations
Multi–conclusion consequence relations are relations  between sets of expressions.
We write Γ  Δ if the pair (Γ,Δ) belongs to the relation. We also write Γ/Δ
for the pair (Γ,Δ), and A,Γ or Γ,A for {A} ∪ Γ , and Γ,Π for Γ ∪ Π . A fini-
tary multi–conclusion consequence relation (mcr) is a relation  between finite
sets of expressions that satisfies for all finite sets of expressions Γ, Γ ′,Δ,Δ′ and
expressions A:
reflexivity {A}  {A},
weakening if Γ  Δ, then Γ ′, Γ  Δ,Δ′,
transitivity if Γ  Δ,A and Γ ′, A  Δ′, then Γ ′, Γ  Δ,Δ′.
For the first and third property we use Scott’s terminology from [13], where multi–
conclusion consequence relations of this form are introduced for the first time. The
second property is called monotonic in Scott’s paper. In Shoesmith and Smiley’s
[14] the first two properties are called overlap and dilution, respectively. Transitivity,
which clearly is not equal to what is usually called transitive in the setting of relations,
is a form of the Cut rule, which is why we sometimes refer to it as such.
A finitary single–conclusion consequence relation (scr) is a relation between finite
sets of expressions and expressions satisfying the single–conclusion variants of the
three properties above, where Γ  {A} is replaced by Γ  A:
Consequence Relations and Admissible Rules 331
reflexivity {A}  A,
weakening if Γ  A, then Γ ′, Γ  A,
transitivity if Γ  C and Γ ′, C  A, then Γ ′, Γ  A.
Although most logics we discuss can be represented via a single–conclusion
consequence relation, the multi–conclusion analogue allows us to express certain
properties more naturally, such as the disjunction property discussed below. We often
omit the word “finitary” in what follows, and when we speak about “consequence
relations” we refer to both multi–conclusion and single–conclusion ones. Given a
mcr , its single–conclusion fragment s is defined as
Γ s A ≡def Γ  {A}.
The minimal single–conclusion and multi–conclusion consequence relations m
and mm are defined as follows.
Γ m A ≡def A ∈ Γ Γ mm Δ ≡def Γ ∩ Δ = ∅.
A is a theorem if ∅  A, which we write as  A. The set of all theorems of a con-
sequence relation is denoted by Th() (called the logical system of the consequence
relation in [17], page 46). Δ is a multi–conclusion theorem if  Δ, which is short for
∅  Δ. The set of all multi–conclusion theorems is denoted by Thm().
In [3] the following observations about the multi–conclusion analogue of single–
conclusion consequence relations can be found. In order to cover languages without




, which are defined as follows, also in the
case the language contains conjunction and disjunction.
Γ 
∧
Δ,Σ ≡def ∀A ∈ Δ : Γ  A,Σ Π,
∨
Γ  Σ ≡def ∀A ∈ Γ : Π,A  Σ
In case the language contains conjunction we express the conjunction of a set of
formulas Γ as
∧
A∈Γ A to distinguish it from the use of
∧
above, and similarly
for disjunction. A single–conclusion consequence relation  can have several multi–
conclusion analogues, meaning multi–conclusion consequence relations that have 
as their single–conclusion fragment. The minimal and maximal one are:
Γ min Δ ≡def ∃A ∈ Δ (Γ  A)
Γ max Δ ≡def ∀Π∀A(Π min∧Γ and Π,∨Δ minA ⇒ Π minA).
The following lemma is but a slight reformulation of Theorem 2 in Dosˇen’s [3].
Lemma 1 min and max are multi–conclusion consequence relations and for any
mcr ′ such that ′s = : min⊆′⊆max.
Proof For the first statement we only show that max is transitive. Therefore suppose
that Γ max A,Δ and Γ ′, A max Δ′ and consider a finite set of formulas Π and
formula B such that Π min ∧(Γ ∪Γ ′) and Π,∨(Δ∪Δ′) min B. We have to show
that Π min B. Observe that for Π ′ being Π ∪ {A} we have Π ′ min ∧(Γ ′ ∪ {A})
and Π ′,
∨




(Δ ∪ {A}) min B. Combining this with Π min ∧Γ and Γ max A,Δ gives
Π min B.
For the second statement, we first prove min ⊆ ′ . If Γ min Δ, then Γ  A
for some A ∈ Δ. And as the single–conclusion fragments of ′ and  are equal, this
gives Γ ′s A. Hence Γ ′ Δ by weakening.
To prove that ′ ⊆ max , assume that Γ ′ Δ for some Γ and Δ. To prove that
Γ max Δ, consider arbitrary Π,B such that Π min ∧Γ and Π,∨Δ min B.
We have to show that Π min B. From Π min ∧Γ it follows that Π ′ Δ, which
combined with Π,
∨
Δ ′ B gives Π ′ B. Hence Π min B.
2.2 The Consequence Relation of a Logic
The following straightforward examples illustrate the way in which logics can be pre-
sented via consequence relations, showing that certain representations are far more
natural than others.
Example 1 Let L be a logic with set of theorems Th(L). Then
Γ  A ≡def A ∈ Γ ∪ Th(L)
defines a single–conclusion consequence relation of which the set of theorems is
Th(L). There are other consequence relations that have Th(L) as the set of their
theorems, such as
{A1, . . . , An}  A ≡def A1 → A2 → · · · → An → A ∈ Th(L)∅  A ≡def A ∈ Th(L).
This is a consequence relation under some mild conditions on the logic. The same
holds for the following consequence relation.
Γ  A ≡def
{
A ∈ Th(L) if Γ = ∅
∃A′ ∈ Γ : A′ → A ∈ Th(L) if Γ = ∅.
Example 2 Many logics are given by a semantics such that
Γ  A ≡def in every model in which all formulas in Γ hold, A holds
defines a consequence relation. Examples are the Kripke model semantics for modal
and intermediate logics.
Example 3 There are two ways in which consequence relations can capture a (multi–
conclusion) sequent calculus G. First, as the definition of a consequence relation G
on finite sets of formulas, given by
Γ G Δ ≡def (Γ ⇒ Δ) is derivable in G.
For standard sequent calculi, such as G3 for classical propositional logic [16], G3
indeed is a multi–conclusion consequence relation. The transitivity of G3 follows
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from the cut-elimination theorem for G3.
Second, as a consequence relation between finite sets of sequents and sequents,
where for sequents S0, . . . , Sn the single–conclusion relation G is defined as
S1, . . . , Sn G S0 ≡def S0 follows from S1, . . . , Sn in G.
Note that transitivity, or cut, on the level of the consequence relation is different from
the cut rule on the level of sequents: (S and S ′ are finite sets of sequents)
S  S S,S ′  S ′
S,S ′  S ′ transitivity
Γ ⇒ Δ,A Γ ′, A ⇒ Δ′
Γ, Γ ′ ⇒ Δ,Δ′ cut.
Since G is a consequence relation, it satisfies transitivity. But the following
statement in general does not hold.
(Γ ⇒ A,Δ), (Γ ′, A ⇒ Δ′) G (Γ, Γ ′ ⇒ Δ,Δ′)
If G is G3, for example, the statement is equivalent to the derivability of the Cut rule,
well-known to be admissible but not derivable. The admissibility of the Cut Rule in
G3 is the statement that the consequence relations G3 and G3+Cut have the same
theorems.
Suppose a logic L is given to us not as a consequence relation but in another way,
for example by a class of models or algebras. What does it mean to say that a conse-
quence relation represents the logic? That depends very much on the application one
has in mind. But let us say that a (single- or multi–conclusion) consequence relation
 covers a logic if Th() equals the set of theorems of the logic, which we denote by
Th(L).
Clearly, there are many consequence relations that cover a single logic L. The
smallest such single–conclusion consequence relation  has already been discussed
in the examples above:
Γ  A ≡def A ∈ Γ ∪ Th(L).
What the greatest consequence relation is that covers L we shall see in Section 4
(Corollary 5).
For logics L being extensions of IPC or IQC (including extensions in a richer
language, such as modal logics), we single out one particular single–conclusion
consequence relation, denoted by L, that covers L as follows (∧ ∅ equals ):







Similarly, we define one particular multi–conclusion consequence relation, also
denoted by L, that covers L:










One could define these specific consequence relations for any logic containing
implication, disjunction, and conjunction, but as we prefer to not address, in this note,
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the delicacies that arise in the setting of substructural logics, we define L here only
for the logics L mentioned above.
2.3 Substitutions
Since we will be mostly interested in rules closed under certain substitutions, we need
to explain which substitutions we consider. If one would wish to present the matter as
formal as possible one should introduce two languages, the meta-language Lm, also
called the schematic language, and the object-language Lo, where all elements of
the meta-language belong to the object language except possibly the meta-variables.
We use the word meta to distinguish the variables from the regular variables that may
occur in the object language. Substitutions are then maps from formulas in the meta-
language to formulas in the object-language that commute with all non-meta-variable
symbols and are the identity on constants, if any are present. In this way every logic
comes with a notion of meta-language and object-language and corresponding set of
substitutions Sub.
In the case of pure propositional or predicate logic the two languages are often
mixed and considered as one. For example, substitutions in propositional logic are
often considered to be maps on formulas commuting with the connectives. In this
paper we will do so too where possible. So when talking about propositional or pred-
icate logic, Lm = Lo and the atoms, respectively the atomic formulas, have a double
role in that they are treated as meta-variables (in the meta-language) as well as atoms
(in the object-language).
In predicate logic, there is a subtlety concerning regular variables, as illustrated by
the rule for the introduction of the universal quantifier:
...
A(y)
∀xA(x) (y is not free in A(x)).
Here A(x) is a meta-variable and we have to indicate what formulas may be sub-
stituted for it. Clearly, there have to be some restrictions. For example, if B(x) is
substituted for A(x), then B(y) should be substituted for A(y), and so on. However,
for this exposition the actual choice is not relevant, and therefore will not be discussed
any further.
In order to be able to express side condition such as “y is not free in A(x)” we
introduce a generalization of rules, called rule schemes, in Section 3.1.
A consequence relation is structural (uniform in [1] and closed under substitution
in [14]) if it satisfies
structurality if Γ  Δ, then σΓ  σΔ for all σ ∈ Sub.
Typically, schematic systems are structural consequence relations, such as
Gentzen calculi, Hilbert systems or natural deduction.
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3 Rules and Derivations
3.1 Rules and Schemes





for finite sets of expressions Γ and Δ. It is sharp if |Δ| ≤ 1. If no confusion is
possible we write A/B for {A}/{B}. A single–conclusion rule is an ordered pair




Γ is the assumption(s) or premiss of rule Γ/Δ and Δ is its conclusion. For R = Γ/Δ,
σR is short for σΓ/σΔ, and similarly for sets of rules.
Given a multi–conclusion consequence relation , rules Γ/Δ such that Γ  Δ are
the rules of the consequence relation and Ru denotes the set of rules of . The rules
of a single–conclusion consequence relation are defined in a similar way, replacing
Δ by A.
Sometimes rules come with restrictions, such as the following atomic contraction
rule and the universal quantifier rule in sequent calculi.
Π,P, P ⇒ Σ
Π,P ⇒ Σ (P is atomic)
Γ ⇒ A(y),Δ
Γ ⇒ ∀xA(x),Δ (y is not free in Γ,Δ)
To capture these rules in our setting we use the notion of a rule scheme, which is
a pair (R, S) consisting of a rule R and a set of substitutions S ⊆ Sub. Like rules
and sets of rules, rule schemes and sets of rule schemes will be denoted by R and R
respectively, trusting that it will always be clear from the context whether the symbol
refers to rules or schemes. Also, a rule R is sometimes considered as a rule scheme
(R, {id}), where id is the identity substitution.
The following definitions apply to single–conclusion as well as multi–conclusion
rule schemes, where in the fist case one should read A for Δ. For σ ∈ S, a rule σR
is called an instance of the rule scheme (R, S), as well as an instance of the rule R.
We define the set of rules that are instances of a rule scheme in R as follows:
RuR ≡def ∪(R,S)∈R{σR | σ ∈ S}.
Given a set R of rule schemes, the extension R of a consequence relation  by
these rule schemes is defined to be the smallest consequence relation extending  for
which Γ  Δ holds for all Γ/Δ in RuR. When all rule schemes in R have the same
set of substitutions S we sometimes write R′S for R, where R′ is the set of rules
that occur in the schemes in R. In case of a single rule scheme (R, S) we write RS
for {(R,S)}.
Similar to the definition for consequence relations in Section 2.2, a set of rules R is
said to cover a logic L if the smallest consequence relation containing R covers L, that
is, if Th(Rm ) =Th(L), where m is defined in Section 2.1. Naturally, a consequence
relation  covers a set of rules R is then defined to mean that Th() =Th(Rm ).
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3.2 Derivations
Given a set R of rules (schemes), a sequence of expressions A1, . . . , An is a
single–conclusion derivation of Γ/A in R if An = A and for all Ai ∈ Γ
there are i1, . . . , im < i such that Ai1 , . . . , Aim/Ai belongs to RuR. In this
case we also say that rule Γ/A is derivable in R, that A follows from Γ or
that Γ derives A in R. A single–conclusion derivation of Γ/Δ is a single–
conclusion derivation of Γ/A, for some A ∈ Δ. (In [14] (p.25) the word
deducible instead of derivable is used.) Observe that the definition applies to
sets R of single–conclusion as well as multi–conclusion rules. What is single–
conclusion derivable from R is determined by its “‘single–conclusion fragment”,
which means by the rules in R that have a single expression (or singleton set) as
conclusion.
Most of Section 3.1 is dedicated to proving (Propositions 2 and 3) that extending
a (singular) consequence relation by a set of (sharp) rule schemes is the same as
allowing these rules in derivations: Γ R Δ if and only if Γ/Δ has a derivation in
Ru ∪ RuR.
For multi–conclusion rules that are not sharp, the analogue of a derivation uses
trees [14]. Here a tree T is a labelled tree in the usual sense that contains at least
two nodes and has a root. In order to have a closer resemblance to standard proofs,
trees are considered upside down, so with the root (the assumptions) at the top,
above all other nodes, and the conclusions at the bottom. Every node k has a label
lb(k), which is a set that is empty or consists of a single expression, except the
root, which has a set of expressions or the empty set as label. The leaves of T are
the nodes with no successors, where k is a successor of l if k is below l. It is an
immediate successor of l if it is immediately below l. k is predecessor of l if l
is a successor of k. The set of leaves is denoted by lf(T ), and lb(T ) denotes the
union of the labels at the leaves of T . For a node k, k ↑ denotes the set consist-
ing of k and all its predecessors, and lb↑(k) is the union of the labels at k and its
predecessors.
Given a set R of rule schemes, a tree T with root r is a multi–conclusion derivation
of Γ/Δ in R if T is finite, lb(r) ⊆ Γ , lb(T ) ⊆ Δ and for every node k whose
immediate successors are k1, . . . , kn, there is a set Γ ′ ⊆ lb↑(k) such that Γ ′/lb(k1)∪
· · · ∪ lb(kn) belongs to RuR.
The definition of a multi–conclusion derivation is slightly awkward because
of the different reading of assumption (conjunctive) and conclusion (disjunc-
tive) of a rule. This problem would disappear once assumptions consisting of
several sets are allowed, but this level of generality is not needed for our
purposes.
As for single–conclusion rules, we show in Proposition 4 that extending a conse-
quence relation by a set of multi–conclusion rules is the same as allowing these rules
in derivations: Γ R Δ if and only if Γ/Δ has a multi–conclusion derivation in
Ru ∪ RuR.
When we speak of derivations we mean single–conclusion derivations. Multi–
conclusion derivations will always be indicated by their full name, so that no
confusion can arise.
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3.3 Example
Suppose that R consists of the rule schemes
{(A → B) → C ∨ D}
{(A → B) → C, (A → B) → D, (A → B) → A)}
A
B
(if IPC A → B)
The second rule scheme is in fact a set of rule schemes, one for each implication
(A → B) that holds in intuitionistic logic. The following is a derivation of the Scott
rule (¬¬A → A) → A ∨ ¬A/{¬A,¬¬A} in R.
(¬¬A → A) → A ∨ ¬A
(¬¬A → A) → A
¬¬A
(¬¬A → A) → ¬A
¬A
(¬¬A → A) → ¬¬A
¬¬A
In agreement with what has been stated above, the above tree has its root at the
top, and nodes are depicted by their labels. Thus in this picture the root has three
successors, which each have one successor. In Section 4.1 (Example 5) the special
role that R plays in intuitionistic logic will be discussed.
The following example from [14] (Figure 3.4) is a multi–conclusion derivation of
B from ¬¬B in a set of multi–conclusion rules that contains the rules {A,¬A}/∅
and ∅/{A,¬A}.
In Proposition 4 below we need the following lemma, which proves the admissi-
bility of cut for multi–conclusion derivations.
Lemma 2 If Γ/Δ,A and Γ ′, A/Δ′ have multi–conclusion derivations in Ru ∪
RuR, then Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′ has a multi–conclusion derivation in Ru ∪ RuR.
Proof Suppose that Γ/Δ,A and Γ ′, A/Δ′ have respective multi–conclusion deriva-
tions T1 and T2 in Ru ∪ RuR. We have to show that Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′ has a multi–
conclusion derivation in Ru ∪RuR. Let ri be the root of Ti . If A is not an element of
lb(T1), then T1 is a multi–conclusion derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′. And if A does not
belong to lb(r2), then T2 is a multi–conclusion derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′. Therefore
suppose that A ∈ lb(T1) ∩ lb(r2). Now let T be the tree obtained by glueing the root
of T2 to all the leaves of T1 with label {A}, and let the label of this node remain {A}.
All other labels remain as they were, except for the root, which receives label Γ ∪Γ ′
in T . It is not difficult to see that T is a multi–conclusion derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′
in Ru ∪ RuR.
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3.4 Derivations and Consequence Relations
We show that in case the underlying multi–conclusion consequence relation is
singular1, meaning that
Γ  Δ ⇒ ∃A ∈ Δ(Γ  A), (1)
for any set R of single–conclusion rule schemes, the consequence relation R cap-
tures precisely the idea of adding the rule schemes R to the consequence relation:
Γ R Δ if and only if Γ/Δ has a single–conclusion derivation in Ru ∪ RuR. That
is, Γ R Δ if and only if some A ∈ Δ can be derived from Γ using only inferences
that are instances of the rule schemes in Ru and R. We will see in Proposition 3 that
a similar statement holds for single–conclusion consequence relations.
If Eq. 1 holds for empty Γ ,  is said to be saturated. For a logic L that contains
disjunction and a consequence relation  that covers it: if  Δ is equivalent to  ∨Δ,
then  is saturated if and only if L has the disjunction property. Thus the multi–
conclusion consequence relation IPC as defined in Section 2.2 is saturated but not
singular.
Given a relation X between finite sets of expressions, the weakening closure and
cut closure of X are defined respectively as follows:
wc(X) ≡def {(Γ ∪ Γ ′,Δ ∪ Δ′) | (Γ,Δ) ∈ X,Γ ′ and Δ′ finite sets of expressions}
cc0(X) ≡def X
cci+1(X) ≡def cci (X) ∪ {(Γ ∪ Γ ′,Δ ∪ Δ′) | for some A : (Γ,Δ ∪ {A}) ∈ cci (X)
and (Γ ′ ∪ {A},Δ′) ∈ cci (X)}
cc(X) ≡def ⋃i cci (X).
Proposition 1 R= cc(wc(Ru ∪ RuR)).
Proof Denote Ru ∪ RuR by X. We prove the proposition by showing that
cc(wc(X)) is a consequence relation. Since it clearly is contained in R, the
minimality condition on R implies that R is actually equal to cc(wc(X)).
To show that cc(wc(X)) is a consequence relation, it suffices to show that it is
closed under weakening and cut, that is, that cc(wc(cc(wc(X)))) = cc(wc(X)).
Because of the definition of cut closure, it suffices to show that wc(cc(wc(X))) =
cc(wc(X)). This follows if for all i, wc(cci (wc(X))) = cci (wc(X)), the proof of
which is straightforward.
Proposition 2 For any singular multi–conclusion consequence relation  and any
set R of sharp multi–conclusion rule schemes: Γ R Δ if and only if Γ/Δ has a
derivation in Ru∪ RuR.
Proof For the direction from right to left it suffices to show that for any derivation
A1, . . . , Am of Γ/Δ in Ru ∪ RuR, for all i we have Γ R Ai , a proof that is
1I thank one of the referees for suggesting this name
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left to the reader. For the other direction we use the equivalence from Proposition 1
stating that R is equal to cc(wc(Ru ∪ RuR)). The rules in Ru ∪ RuR clearly
have a derivation in Ru ∪ RuR because the rules in R are sharp and  is saturated.
Therefore it suffices to show that if all rules in X have a derivation in Ru ∪ RuR,
then so do all rules in wc(X) and cci (X) for all i.
We only show that if all rules in cci (X) have a derivation in Ru ∪ RuR, then
so do all rules in cci+1(X), and leave the rest of the proof to the reader. Consider
rules Γ/Δ,A and Γ ′, A/Δ′ in cci (X) with respective derivations A1, . . . , Am and
B1, . . . , Bn. We show that there exists a derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′ in Ru ∪ RuR. If
Am = A, then A1, . . . , Am is a derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′. And if for no i ≤ n, Bi
equals A, then B1, . . . , Bn is a derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′.
Therefore suppose that A = Am and that A occurs in B1, . . . , Bn−1. We show
that A1, . . . , Am,B1, . . . , Bn is a derivation of Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′ in Ru ∪RuR. Consider
a C ∈ Γ ∪ Γ ′ in the derivation. If C is Ai , then it follows immediately that there
are i1, . . . , ik < i such that Ai1 , . . . , Aik /C is in Ru ∪ RuR, as A1, . . . , Am is a
derivation. If C = Bi , then either C = A or C = A. In the first case C ∈ Γ ′ ∪ {A},
and as B1, . . . , Bn is a derivation, there are i1, . . . , ik < i such that Bi1, . . . , Bik /C
is in Ru ∪RuR. In the second case, Am/C is in Ru because consequence relations
are reflexive.
The following theorem can be found in [14] (Theorem 1.13). The proof given there
is different from the one below, but both proofs are quite straightforward.
Proposition 3 For any single–conclusion consequence relation  and any set R of
single–conclusion rule schemes: Γ R A if and only if Γ/A has a derivation in
Ru∪ RuR.
Proof For  and R as in the proposition, the consequence relation min is a singular
multi–conclusion consequence relation and Rmin = {Γ/{A} | Γ/A ∈ R} is a set of
sharp multi–conclusion rules. Therefore by Proposition 2,
Γ Rminmin {A} if and only if Γ/{A} has a derivation in Rumin ∪ RuRmin .
It is not hard to see that this implies what we have to show once we have
established that
Γ R A ⇔ Γ Rminmin {A}. (2)
To prove (2) it suffices, by Lemma 1, to prove that
Γ R A ⇔ Γ/{A} ∈ cc (wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
))
.
Note that Γ/A ∈ Ru ∪ RuR if and only if Γ/{A} ∈ Rumin ∪ RuRmin .⇒: Since cc (wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
))
is a consequence relation that contains Ru∪
RuR and R is by definition the smallest consequence relation containing Ru ∪RuR,
this inclusion follows.
⇐: Consider R = Γ/{A} ∈ cc (wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
))
. We have to show that
Γ R A. If R ∈ Rumin ∪ RuRmin , then Γ R A follows by definition. Sup-
pose R ∈ wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
)
and let Γ ′/Δ ∈ Rumin ∪ RuRmin be such that
340 Rosalie Iemhoff
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and Δ ⊆ {A}. Since no rules in cc (wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
))
have an empty
conclusion, Δ = {A}. As just observed, Γ ′ R A. Therefore Γ R A as well.
If R ∈ cc (wc (Rumin ∪ RuRmin
))





such that Γ = (Γ1 ∪Γ2). We just saw that then Γ1 R B and
Γ2, B R A. Hence Γ R A also in this case.
The following proposition is the analogue of Proposition 2 for multi–conclusion
consequence relations that are not singular. It occurs as Theorem 3.5 in [14], but the
proof here is different from the one provided there, due to the fact that consequence
relations are there defined in an equivalent but different way than in this note.
Proposition 4 For any multi–conclusion consequence relation  and any set R of
multi–conclusion rule schemes: Γ R Δ if and only if Γ/Δ has a multi–conclusion
derivation in Ru ∪ RuR.
Proof ⇐ First observe that any multi–conclusion derivation T in Ru ∪ RuR of
Γ/Δ is a multi–conclusion derivation in Ru ∪ RuR of Γ/lb(T ) as well. As R
is closed under weakening, it therefore suffices to show, for any multi–conclusion
derivation T of Γ/lb(T ) in Ru ∪ RuR with root r , that Γ R lb(T ). We show this
by proving for every node k in T of depth ≥ 1 that Γ, lb↑(k) R lb(Tk), where Tk
is the subtree of T generated by k, so with root k. This will prove the desired, as
lb↑(r) ⊆ Γ and Tr = T . We use induction to the depth of k, which is the maximal
distance to any of its successors.
If k has depth 1, then Tk consists of root k and leaves k1, . . . , kn, lb(Tk) =⋃
i lb(ki) and by definition Γ
′ ⊆ lb↑(k) exists such that Γ ′/⋃i lb(ki) belongs to
Ru ∪ RuR, which clearly implies Γ, lb↑(k) R lb(Tk).
Suppose k has depth greater than 1 and immediate successors k1, . . . , km. Observe
that lb(Tk) = ⋃mi=1 lb(Tki ) and k ↑= ki ↑ \{ki} for all i. The induction hypothe-
sis gives Γ, lb↑(ki) R lb(Tki ). Because Γ, lb↑(k) R lb(k1) ∪ · · · ∪ lb(km) by the
definition of T , this implies Γ, lb↑(k) R lb(Tk) by weakening in case all lb(ki)
are empty. In case some lb(ki) are not empty, one can use the transitivity of conse-
quence relations to obtain Γ, lb↑(k) R ⋃mi=1 lb(Tki ). Thus in both cases we have
Γ, lb↑(k) R lb(Tk), which is what had to be shown.
⇒ By Proposition 1 it suffices to show that any Γ/Δ in Ru ∪ RuR has a multi–
conclusion derivation in Ru ∪ RuR, and if all rules in X have a multi–conclusion
derivation in Ru ∪ RuR, then so do wc(X) and cci (X) for all i. We prove the first
and the last statement.
For the first statement, suppose that Γ/Δ belongs to Ru ∪ RuR, where Δ =
{A1, . . . , An} is not empty. Then the following tree is a multi–conclusion derivation
of it.
Γ
{A1} . . . {An}
In case Δ = ∅, the multi–conclusion derivation looks as follows.
Γ
∅
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For the last statement it suffices to show that if Γ/Δ,A and Γ ′, A/Δ′ have multi–
conclusion derivations in Ru∪RuR, then so does Γ, Γ ′/Δ,Δ′. This is exactly what
is proven in Lemma 2.
3.5 Hilbert Systems
In Section 2.2 we saw that for a consequence relation to cover a logic, the only
requirement is that it has the same theorems as the logic. Sometimes a logic is given
to us in such a way that one wonders whether a closer connection between a conse-
quence relation and the logic exists. This is especially the case with Hilbert systems
[16].
Hilbert systems are given as a set of axioms and rules, which in our terminology
are rule schemes, where the set of substitutions for every rule is the maximal one, Sub.
For example, a Hilbert system for the implication fragment of intuitionistic proposi-
tional logic is given by the set R consisting of Modus Ponens and the Łukasiewicz
axioms
A → (B → A) (A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C)),
where Sub is the substitution set of every rule. A proof of A from Γ is then thought
of as a sequence of formulas in which every formula either is in Γ or follows via
the rules in R from formulas earlier in the sequence, which in our terminology
(Section 3.2) amounts to: Γ/A has a derivation in RuR. For example, the follow-
ing sequence is a proof of D → D from empty assumptions, where E abbreviates
D → D.
(D → (E → D)) → ((D → E) → (D → D)),D → (E → D),
(D → E) → (D → D),D → E,D → D.
We therefore say that a consequence relation  faithfully covers the Hilbert system
given by R if Γ  A holds exactly if Γ/A has a derivation in RuR. Recall that in
Section 3.1  is said to cover R if Th = Th(R), where Rm stands for the minimal
single–conclusion consequence relation defined in Section 2.1. The following corol-
lary of Proposition 3 shows that if a Hilbert system is given by R, then Rm faithfully
covers it. The discussion below the corollary shows that not all coverings are faithful.
Corollary 1 For any set R of single–conclusion rule schemes: Γ Rm A if and only if
Γ/A has a derivation in RuR.
Proof Because of Proposition 3 it suffices to show that a derivation in Rum ∪ RuR
is a derivation in RuR, a proof that we leave to the reader.
In Section 2.2, for logics L being extensions of IPC or IQC (including extension in
a richer language, such as modal logics), the consequence relation L is defined as
Γ L A if and only if (∧B∈Γ B → A) ∈ Th(L). Suppose that L is covered by the
Hilbert system R, then in general L does not need to be equal to Rm . For example,
if R consists only of the theorems of L, thus only of axioms, then Γ Rm A will only
hold if A ∈ Γ or A ∈ Th(L), while Γ L A will hold in many more cases, such as in
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A,B L A ∧ B or A L A ∨ B. The following proposition shows that, if R contains
Modus Ponens and a rule for conjunction, L⊆ Rm does in fact hold. Thus this holds
in particular for Hilbert systems containing these two rules.
Proposition 5 For any logic L that is an extension of IPC or IQC that is covered by
a set of rules R that contains the rule schemes ((B,C/B ∧ C), Sub) and Modus
Ponens ((B → C,B/C), Sub): L⊆Rm .
Proof Suppose for some Γ and A that Γ L A, which means that (∧B∈Γ B) →
A belongs to Th(L). Since L is covered by R, (∧B∈Γ B) → A is an element of
Th(Rm ). By the first condition on R, Γ Rm
∧
B∈Γ B. By the second condition and
the transitivity of consequence relations, Γ Rm A follows.
4 Derivability and Admissibility
In this section we introduce the two notions, derivability and admissibility, that were
the motivation for spelling out the details of consequence relations in the previous
sections. Intuitively, derivable rules are the rules explicitly given by the consequence
relation, while admissible rules can be used in proofs without changing the theo-
rems that can be derived. Our definition of admissibility for multi–conclusion rules,
according to the full view given in the introduction, is more general than the one
found in the literature, which is usually the one based on the strict view.
Given a mcr , a rule R = Γ/Δ is derivable if Γ  Δ. Note that by
Proposition 4 this is equal to R having a multi–conclusion derivation in Ru, as
defined in Section 3.1. The rule scheme (R, S) is derivable if for all σ ∈ S, σR is
derivable. (R, S) is admissible, written Γ |∼S Δ, if Thm() = Thm(RS ). A rule
R = Γ/Δ is admissible, written Γ |∼ Δ, if (R, Sub) is admissible, which means, if
Thm() = Thm(RSub). A set of rules (schemes) is admissible if all of its members
are. Similarly for single–conclusion consequence relations. Thus we have defined:
Γ |∼ Δ ≡def Thm() = Thm(Γ/ΔSub ).
Observe that for saturated consequence relations:
Γ |∼ Δ ⇔ Th() = Th(Γ/ΔSub ). (3)
The analogues of the above definitions for single–conclusion consequence rela-
tions can be obtained by replacing the set of expressions Δ by a single expression A.
Thus Eq. 3 holds also in case  is a scr.
It is clear that for structural consequence relations, derivable rules are admissible.
The converse, however, is not always the case. In case it is, the consequence rela-
tion is called structurally complete: a single–conclusion consequence relation  is
structurally complete [10] if all admissible single–conclusion rules (in the same lan-
guage) are derivable. It is hereditarily structurally complete if all extensions in the
same language are structurally complete. A multi–conclusion consequence relation
 is universally complete [2] if all admissible multi–conclusion rules are derivable.
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Clearly,  is structurally complete if it coincides with |∼. For single–conclusion con-
sequence relations the converse holds as well, and moreover, structural completeness
is in that case equivalent to having no proper extensions in the same language with
the same theorems.
Structural completeness depends very much on the particular consequence relation
one uses for a logic. That is, a logic can have two consequence relations that both
cover it, where the one is structurally complete, and the other is not. For example,
as is well–known, CPC is structurally complete [10] and covers CPC. However, the
minimal consequence relation covering CPC,
Γ  A ⇔ A ∈ Γ ∪ Th(CPC),
is certainly not structurally complete, as ¬¬A/A is admissible but nonderivable in
it. More will be said about classical logic in Section 5.
In contrast to structural completeness, admissibility solely depends on the (multi–
conclusion) theorems of a consequence relation, as can be seen from the definition as
well as Proposition 6 below. Using the developed terminology, the full and strict view
for single–conclusion consequence relations and single–conclusion rule schemes
(R, S) becomes:
(full) (R, S) is admissible in  if Th() = Th(RS ).
(strict) (R, S) is admissible in  if under all substitutions in S, whenever all
expressions in the premiss of R become theorems of , then so does the
conclusion.
As mentioned in the introduction, the full definition of admissibility is the one
most often given when the notion is described informally. The strict definition, how-
ever, is the one most used in technical settings. Corollary 2 states that they are the
same. First we prove the following proposition for the multi–conclusion setting.





Proposition 6 For every consequence relation :
Γ |∼S Δ ⇔ ∀σ ∈ S ∀Σ : 
∧
σΓ,Σ ⇒  σΔ,Σ.
Proof Let R = Γ/Δ.
⇒ Suppose Γ |∼S Δ, that is, Thm() = Thm(RS ). If  σA,Σ for all A ∈ Γ and
some σ ∈ S and some Σ , this means σA,Σ belongs to Thm() for all A ∈ Γ . Hence
σΔ,Σ belongs to Thm(RS ), and therefore σΔ,Σ ∈ Thm(), that is,  σΔ,Σ .⇐ Assuming the right side of the equivalence, we show that Thm() equals
Thm(RS ). Therefore assume RS Σ . By Proposition 4 there is a multi–conclusion
derivation T of ∅/Σ in Ru ∪ Ru{(R,S)} = Ru ∪ {σR | σ ∈ S}. Thus lb(T ), the
labels of the leaves of T , are contained in Σ and the label lb(r) at the root is empty.
For a node k, let lbs(k) be the union of the labels of the immediate successors of
k. First we prove that for all nodes k and all finite sets Π of expressions:

∧
lb↑(k),Π ⇒  lbs(k),Π. (4)
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Note that because of the implicit universal quantifier at the left, the implcation
above implies that  lbs(k) holds for all k for which lb↑(k) is empty.
To prove Eq. 4, assume that  ∧ lb↑(k),Π . By the definition of trees there is a
Γ ′ ⊆ lb↑(k) such that Γ ′/lbs(k) belongs to Ru ∪ Ru{(R,S)}. If Γ ′/lbs(k) belongs to
Ru, then lb↑(k)  lbs(k), and  lbs(k),Π follows. If, on the other hand, Γ ′/lbs(k)
belongs to Ru{(R,S)}, then Γ ′ = σΓ and lbs(k) = σΔ for some σ ∈ S. Hence
 ∧ σΓ,Π , and thus  σΔ,Π , that is,  lbs(k),Π .
Next we show with induction to the depth of a node that for all nodes k and all
finite sets Π of expressions:

∧
lb↑(k),Π ⇒  Σ,Π.
As lb↑(r) is empty, this will prove the desired. Assume  ∧ lb↑(k),Π . Thus
 lbs(k),Π by Eq. 4. If k has depth 1, lbs(k) ⊆ lb(T ) ⊆ Σ and we are done.
If k has depth greater than 1, consider its immediate successors k1, . . . , kn. Thus
lbs(k) = lb(k1) ∪ · · · ∪ lb(kn) and lb↑(ki) = lb(ki) ∪ lb↑(k). Because  lbs(k),Π
and  ∧ lb↑(k),Π we have  ∧ lb↑(k1),Π ∪ lb(k2) ∪ · · · ∪ lb(kn). The induction
hypothesis for k1 gives  Σ ∪ lb(k2)∪· · ·∪ lb(kn)∪Π . The induction hypothesis for
k2 gives  Σ ∪ lb(k3)∪· · ·∪ lb(kn)∪Π . And so on, proving that  Σ,Π holds.
Corollary 2 Every saturated consequence relation  satisfies
Γ |∼S Δ ⇔ ∀σ ∈ S : 
∧
σΓ ⇒ (∃B ∈ Δ  σB).
Every single–conclusion consequence relation  satisfies
Γ |∼S A ⇔ ∀σ ∈ S : 
∧
σΓ ⇒  σA.
The last proposition and corollary imply the following corollary, the proof of
which is straightforward.
Corollary 3 Both in the single–conclusion and the multi–conclusion context, |∼ is a
consequence relation. If the underlying consequence relation is structural, so is |∼.
Corollary 4 For a saturated multi–conclusion consequence relation , multi–
conclusion |∼ is the greatest multi–conclusion consequence relation in the same
language with the same multi–conclusion theorems as . And the same when “multi”
is replaced by “single” and the word “saturated” is omitted.
Proof We show that for multi–conclusion consequence relations , |∼ is the greatest
consequence relation such that Thm() = Thm(|∼). That Thm() is contained in
Thm(|∼) is clear. For the other direction, suppose |∼ Δ. By Proposition 6,  Δ
follows, thus showing that Thm() ⊇ Thm(|∼). If Thm() = Thm(′) for some
consequence relation ′, then for all rule schemes (R, S) derivable in ′, it follows
that Thm() = Thm(RS , and thus that R is admissible. Thus proving that ′ is
contained in |∼.
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Corollary 5 For any logic L and any single–conclusion consequence relation 
that covers L, |∼ is the greatest single–conclusion consequence relation in the same
language that covers L.
Remark 1 The full definition of admissibility for multi–conclusion rule schemes
(R, S) as given informally in the introduction becomes in our terminology:
(full) (R, S) is admissible in  if Thm = ThmRS .
At first glance, the following might seem to be the correct analogue for the strict
definition.
(R, S) is admissible in  if under all substitutions in S, whenever the premiss of
R becomes a multi–conclusion theorem of , then so does the conclusion.
However, this is not equivalent to the full definition. Here is an actual counter
example. Let R be {p}/{q} and S consist of the identity substitution, and let the
multi–conclusion consequence relation  be the smallest one such that  {p, q}
holds. Then it certainly holds that whenever the expressions in the premiss of R
becomes a theorem of , then so does the conclusion, as p is no theorem of . On
the other hand, Thm() is not equal to Thm(RS ). Not even Th() is equal to Th(RS ),
as the former does not contain q, while the latter does.
It follows from Proposition 6 that the strict analogue is:
(strict) (Γ/Δ, S) is admissible in  if for all σ ∈ S and all finite Σ , whenever
σA,Σ ∈ Thm() for all A ∈ Γ , then σΔ,Σ ∈ Thm().
Indeed, under this strict notion the above counter example ceases to be so, as for
Σ = {q} and σ the identity,  σp,Σ holds but  σq,Σ does not.
4.1 Bases
Given consequence relations ⊆ ′, a set R of rules is a basis for ′ over  if
R=′. In particular, R is a basis for R over . From the definition it follows that
R is a basis for the admissible rules of a given consequence relation  iff the rules in
R are admissible in  and all admissible rules of  are derivable in R:
|∼ = R .
This notion allows one to describe |∼ without having to include redundancies. For
example, for intermediate or modal logics L, if the rule R = A/B is admissible, then
so is A ∧ C/B ∧ C, but we do not have to add the latter to the basis as it is derivable
in RL :
A ∧ CRL A ARL B
A ∧ CRL B
A ∧ CRL C B,CRL B ∧ C
B,A ∧ CRL B ∧ C
A ∧ CRL B ∧ C
Here we use that A ∧ C L A and B,C L B ∧ C hold, which is the case for all
logics L in which A ∧ C → A and B ∧ C → B ∧ C hold, by the definition of L.
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There always is a basis for the admissible rules of a consequence relation, namely
the set of all its admissible rules. Naturally, one often looks for bases with better
properties, such as finite ones or those consisting of the instances of one partic-
ular rule scheme. Many intermediate and modal logics and fragments thereof are
known to have nonderivable admissible rules, and for several an explicit basis for the
admissible rules is known. We refer the reader to (the references in) [6, 12].
Example 4 No doubt the most famous admissible rule (for intermediate logics) is the
Kreisel–Putnam rule:
¬A → B ∨ C
(¬A → B) ∨ (¬A → C) KP
Prucnal [11] discovered the universal character of this rule, a result later strengthened
by Minari and Wron´ski [8] who showed the admissibility, in any intermediate logic,
of the stronger Harrop rule HR, which is the rule
A → B ∨ C
(A → B) ∨ (¬A → C) HR (A a Harrop formula)
That not every instance of KP is derivable follows from the underivability of the cor-
responding implication (¬A → B∨C) → (¬A → B)∨(¬A → C) in intuitionistic
logic. As negations are Harrop formulas, the same holds for HR.
Example 5 Interestingly, in modal and intermediate logics certain rule schemes seem
generic in that they cannot be admissible without being a basis. Intuitionistic logic as
well as many transitive modal logics such as K4, S4 and GL, have such bases [5, 7].
What happens once such rules are not admissible is at present less clear. In [4] it is
shown that for intuitionistic logic, the basis consists of generalizations of a rule that
we have encountered before, in Section 3.1:
{(A → B) → C ∨ D}
{(A → B) → C, (A → B) → D, (A → B) → A)}
We will not provide the argument, but it is not hard to see that this rule is admissible
in IPC. Hence so is the Scott rule (¬¬A → A) → A ∨ ¬A/{¬A,¬¬A} from
Section 3.1.
5 Singularity
In Section 2.2 we discussed a variety of ways in which a consequence relation can
be associated with a logic. From Lemma 1 it follows that if one starts with a logic
L covered by a single–conclusion consequence relation , then the smallest multi–
conclusion consequence relation having the same theorems as L is
Γ min Δ ≡def ∃A ∈ Δ (Γ  A).
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Clearly, this consequence relation is singular. And by Corollary 2 the strict view
on the corresponding notion of admissibility, |∼min, is equal to the dp–strict view
from the introduction:
Γ |∼minΔ ≡def ∀σ ∈ Sub : min
∧
σΓ ⇒ ∃B ∈ Δ(min σB ).
This is the reason that in most papers on admissibility the above notions are taken
as the definitions of derivability and admissibility outright. That is, given a single–
conclusion consequence relation , one defines:
Γ/Δ is derivable ≡def ∃A ∈ Δ (Γ  A)
Γ/Δ is admissible ≡def ∀σ ∈ Sub : 
∧
σΓ ⇒ ∃B ∈ Δ( σB ).
We call this the dp–view because using these definitions one can express the dis-
junction property via admissibility: a logic has the disjunction property if and only if
the rule {A ∨ B}/{A,B} is admissible.
In this paper we have chosen a more general approach because we wished to
allow for multi–conclusion consequence relations that are not of the form min.
But it captures the usual approach once one agrees to consider min as the natural
multi–conclusion consequence relation associated with a logic.
We already encountered multi–conclusion consequence relations not of the form
min. For example, in Section 2.2 the multi–conclusion consequence relation CPC is
defined as










Clearly, if one starts with a single–conclusion consequence relation  that covers
CPC, then {p ∨ q} min {p, q} does not hold. But {p ∨ q} CPC {p, q} does. In
fact, CPC is structurally complete. For suppose Γ |∼CPC Δ. By Proposition 6 this
implies that for all substitutions that map atoms to  or ⊥, if Γ ⊆ Th CPC, then
Δ ∈ Thm CPC. From this it follows that (∧A∈Γ A →
∨
B∈Δ B) is a tautology.
Therefore Γ/Δ is derivable in CPC.
All this shows that there are certain design choices to be made when defining
admissibility for multi–conclusion consequence relation. And, as often, what is best
depends on the context in which one wishes to use them.
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